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Summary
The policy brief focuses on the role of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in 
the context of UN Integrated Missions. The primary 
leadership function of the SRSG is to facilitate a proc-
ess that can generate and maintain strategic direc-
tion and operational coherence across the political, 
governance, development, economic, and security 
dimensions of a peacebuilding process. 
The power and influence of the SRSG resides not 
in the resources that he or she can directly bring 
to bear on a specific situation, but in the ability to 
muster and align the resources of a large number 
of agencies, donors, and countries to support the 
peacebuilding effort in a given context. 
This type of leadership role implies that a person 
with skills, experience and a personality suited to 
multi-stakeholder mediation and negotiations is 
more likely to be a successful SRSG than someone 
who is used to top–down, autocratic, military com-
mand, private sector, or direct-control type leader-
ship styles. 
This perspective on the role of the SRSG has impor-
tant implications for the way in which people are 
chosen and prepared for these positions, as well as 
for the ways in which support can be provided for 
this role, both at UN headquarters and in the field.
Introduction
This policy brief is based on the article ‘Mediation and 
Peacebuilding: SRSGs and DSRSGs in Integrated Mis-
sions’ that appeared in Global Governance, Vol. 16 No. 
2 (Apr.–June 2010), as part of a special focus edition on 
Post-War Mediation in UN Peace Operations: the Role of 
Special Representatives of the Secretary-General.1  It focus-
es on the type of leadership roles that are most effec-
tive for a Special Representative of the Secretary-Gen-
eral (SRSG) in the context of a UN Integrated Mission. 
The role of the SRSG is widely recognized as com-
plex and multifaceted. The SRSG is the overall head 
of a multidimensional UN peacekeeping or political 
mission.2 In the case of UN Integrated Missions, the 
SRSG is also the overall coordinator of the UN system 
in a given country,3 and is further expected to play a 
leading role in coordinating the overall international 
effort on the ground. In many cases, the SRSG is also 
the lead mediator in the ongoing postwar mediation 
efforts, and/or in any emerging post-settlement dis-
putes between local political actors. Another criti-
1 The author appreciates the editorial support of Ingrid Marie 
Breidlid of NUPI, as well as very useful comments and sug-
gestions by Timothy D. Sisk, colleagues and peer reviewers at 
Global Governance.
2 There are still a few traditional peacekeeping missions where 
the head of mission is the Force Commander, such as the UN 
Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the 
UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), the UN Interim 
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the UN Truce Supervision Or-
ganization (UNTSO).
3 There are a few exceptions, such as Sudan, which hosts two 
peacekeeping missions (UNMIS and UNAMID) and thus two 
SRSGs, and the mission in Chad and the Central African Re-
public (MINURCAT), where one SRSG has responsibility for a 
mission that includes parts of two countries. MINURCAT and 
UNAMID are not Integrated Missions.
 From Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and 
International Organizations, Vol. 16, No. 2. Copyright C 2010 
by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Used with permission by the 
publisher.
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cally important role for the SRSG is to serve as the 
primary liaison between local and international actors. 
Peacebuilding and Coherence
The UN Secretary-General’s report, Peacebuild-
ing in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict,4 de-
scribes peacebuilding as a range of measures tar-
geted to reduce the risk of a (re)lapse into conflict 
by strengthening national capacities at all levels 
for conflict management, and by laying the foun-
dations for sustainable peace and development.5 
The UN missions typically headed by an SRSG can be 
described as peacebuilding missions, because they are 
post-settlement missions focused on peace consolida-
tion.  The SRSGs heading such missions are responsi-
ble not only for the peacekeeping or political mission, 
but also for the wider UN and international effort, 
and for bringing together the various stakeholders, 
and coordinating the overall peacebuilding process.6 
Peacebuilding requires the engagement of a wide 
range of internal and external agents, including gov-
ernments, civil society, the private sector and inter-
national agencies. These actors should be working 
together in a coherent and coordinated effort, but in 
reality they often compete with each other for resourc-
es and opportunities. The Joint Utstein Study7 of peace-
building, which analysed 336 peacebuilding projects 
implemented by Germany, the Netherlands, the Unit-
ed Kingdom and Norway over the last decade, identi-
fied a lack of coherence at the strategic level – what it 
terms a strategic deficit – as the most significant ob-
stacle to sustainable peacebuilding. The Utstein study 
found that more than 55% of the programmes it evalu-
ated did not show any link to a larger country strategy. 
Although pursuing coherence is now widely ac-
knowledged as a prerequisite for effective peace-
building at the policy level, there still appears to be 
a considerable gap between the degree to which co-
herence seems to be self-evident, and the persistent 
challenges experienced in the field to achieve coher-
ence at the operational level. In the real world, those 
pursuing coherence often have to settle for the ‘sec-
ond-best’ or ‘partially coherent’ solutions, in order 
to establish a workable foundation for cooperation. 
The SRSG is ultimately responsible for pursuing 
overall coherence, and is thus deeply engaged in 
these negotiated transactions. Coherence is a goal, 
not an end-state. The process of seeking coherence, 
and thereby engaging various agents in the process, 
generates value because it provides the SRSG with 
the opportunity to influence and facilitate the man-
agement of the interdependencies among the agents.
Integrated Missions
In the UN context, Integrated Missions and the In-
tegrated Approach refer to a specific type of opera-
tional process and design, where planning and coor-
dination processes of the various elements of the UN 
family are integrated into a single-level UN system. 
In UN peacekeeping, a mission becomes an ‘Integrated 
Mission’ when the Resident Coordinator/Humanitar-
ian Coordinator (RC/HC) function is integrated with 
the peacekeeping operation through the appointment 
of a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-
General (DSRSG) responsible for the RC/HC func-
tion. ‘Integrated Mission’ refers to integration across 
the UN system: through the DSRSG RC/HC function, 
the peace and security responsibilities of a UN peace-
keeping operation are linked with the development 
and humanitarian functions represented by the vari-
ous UN agencies present in the UN Country Team. 
The Integrated Approach differs from the Integrated 
Missions concept in that it does not require structural 
integration – although it may provide for it, where ap-
propriate. Instead, the Integrated Approach refers to 
a strategic partnership between the UN peacekeep-
ing operation and the UN Country Team, where all 
components of the UN system are to operate in a 
coherent and mutually supportive manner, in close 
collaboration with other partners. UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki Moon has reaffirmed the Integrated 
Approach as the guiding principle for all conflict and 
post-conflict situations where the UN has a country 
team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping opera-
tion, or a political or peacebuilding office, whether 
these missions are structurally integrated or not.8 
The role of the SRSG is to manage this overall proc-
ess in close cooperation with the DSRSG RC/HC.
The strategic leadership and coordination role of 
the SRSG should further be understood in a wid-
er international context where coherence is pur-
sued at the national level among government de-
8 Decision Number 2008/24 – Integration, Decisions of the Secre-
tary-General, 25 June 2008 Policy Committee (New York: Unit-
ed Nations, 2008).
4 Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate 
Aftermath of Conflict, A/63/881-S/2009/304, New York: United 
Nations, 11 June 2009.2 There are still a few traditional peace-
keeping missions where the head of mission is the Force Com-
mander, such as the UN Military Observer Group in India and 
Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the UN Disengagement Observer Force 
(UNDOF), the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the 
UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).
5 This definition of peacebuilding is based on the notes of the Sec-
retary-General’s Policy Committee on Peacebuilding, May 2007 
(New York: United Nations, 2007).
6 These SRSG roles are described in both the ‘New Horizon’ non-
paper and the Secretary-General’s Report on Peacebuilding.
7 Dan Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: the 
Synthesis Report of the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding (Oslo: 
PRIO, 2003).
3partments (whole-of-government approach), and 
inter nationally among donors (harmonization), as 
well as between donor and recipients (alignment).
The SRSG as Process Facilitator
The complexity of the coherence dilemma is due, in 
part, to the dynamic tension between the independ-
ence and interdependence of the agents engaged in 
the peacebuilding missions.9 Each agent independ-
ently undertakes activities that address specific fac-
ets of the conflict spectrum, but a collective and 
cumulative effect is needed to achieve the overall 
peacebuilding goal. The core role of the SRSG is to 
facilitate the processes that manage these interde-
pendencies within the peacebuilding system. As 
the only institution with system-wide responsibil-
ity, the SRSG is uniquely positioned to play this role. 
The SRSG is tasked with coordinating and leading a 
system made up of multiple independent agents in con-
trol of their own resources. This implies that the SRSG 
cannot control or direct these independent agents in 
the same way that a general can control an army, or a 
manager can direct the employees and business units 
in a company. The SRSG will need to employ a differ-
ent set of tools and skills than those typically associated 
with managing a company or commanding an army. 
When facilitating a peace process, the SRSG does not 
have control over the inputs, and can only indirectly 
influence the outputs that are meant to generate mo-
mentum towards the desired outcomes and impacts. 
It is important to recognize that the SRSG has no direct 
authority over the UN agencies. Even when it comes 
to peacekeeping or political missions, the SRSG’s 
authority is extremely limited and subject to negotia-
tions with others in the system, including UN head-
quarters in New York and ultimately with the mem-
ber states of the UN, which control the resources and 
direct the policies of the world organization. In these 
areas, the authority of the SRSG and the authority of 
the UN Secretary-General are similarly constrained. 
Hence, the power of the SRSG lies not in control over 
resources or agencies, but in the ability to mobilize 
and align the resources of a large number of agencies, 
donors and countries to support the peacebuilding ef-
fort in a given context. The SRSG has the authority and 
credibility to convene, and can use that opportunity to 
facilitate a coordination process. The overall effect of 
this process can result in a much more comprehen-
sive and all-encompassing effort than what any one or-
ganization could otherwise have achieved on its own. 
Key entry-points for such system-wide integra-
tion are common assessments, integrated plan-
ning, operational coordination, and monitoring 
and feedback. These processes provide common 
spaces where agents can come together, make 
contributions, learn from each other and veri-
fy their information, analyses and perceptions. 
The role of the SRSG is to facilitate the process that gen-
erates strategic direction and operational coherence in 
the system, not to control it. The SRSG can influence 
the process, but cannot direct it. The SRSG manage 
the process, not the UN mission, UN system or over-
all international effort. This is an important distinc-
tion to bear in mind, and to factor into how SRSGs are 
selected, prepared, managed (from a human resourc-
es perspective) and evaluated. Two factors stand out 
here: (a) personality and (b) process, or process tools. 
The ability to organize people around system-wide 
objectives and goals and to make them understand 
how their individual programmes add up to the larg-
er common effort, are critical skills and attributes 
for a successful SRSG. A person with skills, experi-
ence and a personality suited to multi-stakeholder 
mediation and negotiations is thus more likely to be-
come a successful peacebuilding system SRSG than 
someone used to top–down, autocratic, military, pri-
vate sector or direct-control type leadership styles. 
Process tools are also critical, providing opportuni-
ties for agents to come together in a common space, 
to articulate their own positions, and to learn from 
each other. Process tools provide the opportunity to 
triangulate information and, in the process, create 
a new common narrative. Processes, such as com-
mon assessments, joint planning, joint monitor-
ing, etc. are useful tools for engaging the various 
agents in a common objective. SRSGs should have 
knowledge and experience, directly or through sup-
port systems, of the process tools available to them, 
and how best to employ them to pursue coherence. 
Frustrations with the perceived Limits of Process Fa-
cilitation
Many in the UN system and beyond, including some 
current and past SRSGs and DSRSGs, have argued 
that the process facilitation role of the SRSG is in-
sufficient, weak and flawed. These voices argue for 
strengthening the role of the SRSG in terms of the 
authority the SRSG should have over UN peacekeep-
ing and political missions, as well as over the other 
UN agencies at the country level. Some also argue 
that SRSGs, or the DSRSGs RC/HC, should have a 
fund at their disposal and under their direct authority. 
The question of whether SRSGs should have the 
power to direct UN agencies is related both to the 
de jure legal and administrative status of these agen-
9 Cedric de Coning, Coherence and Coordination in United Nations 
Peacebuilding and Integrated Missions: A Norwegian Perspective, 
Security in Practice No. 5 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, 2007), p.3. 
4Policy Brief 5 · 2010
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
P.O. Box 8159 Dep, N-0033 Oslo, Norway 
www.nupi.no
Established in 1959, the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs [NUPI] is 
a leading independent research institute 
on international politics and areas of 
relevance to Norwegian foreign policy. 
Formally under the Ministry of Education 
and Research, NUPI nevertheless operates 
as an independent, non-political instance 
in all its professional activities. Research 
undertaken at NUPI ranges from short-term 
applied research to more long-term basic 
research.
NUPI’s Issue Briefs and Policy Briefs are 
published by the Department of Secu-
rity and Conflict Management at NUPI. 
This Department undertakes applied 
research, policy analysis, concept devel-
opment and assistance on multinational 
and multidimensional peace support 
and stability operations and related 
themes, and seeks to address most 
aspects of peace support operations 
from intervention to long-term peace 
building and security sector reform. 
Geographical foci include Africa, the 
Balkans, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
About the Author
Cedric de Coning is a Research Fellow with 
ACCORD and the Norwegian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs. He started his career as a South 
African diplomat in Washington D.C. and Addis 
Ababa, and he also worked for the UN Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations in East Timor and in 
New York. He has worked closely with African Un-
ion on the development of the civilian dimension 
of the African Standby Force, and with the UN on 
the training of civilian experts for UN peacekeep-
ing operations.
The research was made possible through a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs through the Training for Peace in Africa Programme (TfP).
cies, as well as to the de facto benefits of their sus-
tained independence. There are in fact several 
ways in which the authority of the SRSG can be 
increased without negatively impacting on the le-
gal status or independence of these UN agencies. 
While it is also possible to give SRSGs and Deputy 
SRSGs responsibility over specific funds, one should 
carefully balance the benefits of giving them direct 
authority over a relatively small amount of funds as 
opposed to indirect influence over the whole poten-
tial pool of funds available in a given peacebuilding 
system. There is a danger that the association of the 
SRSG or DSRG with the interests of one specific fund 
might undermine their broader coordination role. The 
role of the SRSG should be elevated above the market-
place, so that there is no conflict of interest. Staying 
above the fray will ensure that the SRSG is in the most 
favourable position to facilitate a coherence-seeking 
process with credibility and objectivity – similar to a 
mediator in a multi-stakeholder negotiation process. 
Ultimately, the SRSG function derives its power of in-
fluence and authority from its political credibility. The 
SRSG represents the will of the international com-
munity as expressed by the UN Security Council. This 
tacit authority, as well as the active political support 
expressed by the international community, is what 
provides the SRSG with political capital. Credibility 
and political capital can further be increased by the 
way the SRSG relates to the member states and inter-
nal actors, as well as by the way the SRSG chooses to 
use the political capital. Hence, the role of the SRSG 
is ultimately a political role, not a management one. 
Persons chosen for this function should be chosen 
for their political skills, and their ability to facilitate 
complex, multi-stakeholder and long-term processes.
Conclusions
Despite frustrations and criticisms, the role of the 
SRSG as the overall head of a peacekeeping or politi-
cal mission, the overall coordinator of the UN system, 
and the overall facilitator and convenor of the interna-
tional community, remains unchallenged. The overall 
leadership role of the SRSG, and the need for such 
a role, appear to be widely recognized and accepted. 
There is, however, a limit to the degree of control 
that the international community and UN member 
states are willing to delegate to the SRSG. There ex-
ist many political, financial and organizational rea-
sons for these limits – and they are highly unlikely 
to change significantly in the foreseeable future. 
On the other hand, there are no limits on the potential 
power of the SRSG to facilitate the peacebuilding proc-
ess. The SRSG enjoys enormous latitude to gain and use 
political capital and to steer and influence the process-
es that guide the overall peace process in a given coun-
try or conflict system. The degree to which an SRSG 
can transform this potential into reality depends on the 
personal skills and experience of the individual SRSG.
The selection, preparation and support of 
SRSGs are thus critical entry and leverage 
points for the UN Secretariat. Improvements in 
each of these areas can have a significant influ-
ence on the strengthening the role of the SRSG.
Ultimately, the primary leadership function of the 
SRSG is to facilitate a process that can generate and 
maintain strategic direction and operational coherence 
across the political, governance, development, eco-
nomic and security dimensions of the peace process.
